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‘Ritual Individualisation’: Creative Genius at Sentencing, Mitigation and 
Conviction 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Judges and lawyers must regard themselves as upholding cherished values, including: 
the presumption of innocence; free defendant choice and participation; and attention to 
the unique individual. Yet, everyday criminal work also demands compliance with a 
system of perfunctory, mass case-disposal. How is this potential contradiction 
addressed? Conceiving the criminal-penal process as a tripartite rite of passage, the 
article originates the concept of ‗Ritual Individualisation‘ (RI). RI‘s creative pre-
sentencing case-work accomplishes four key transformations in how the person is re-
presented to the court for sentencing. Firstly, the person‘s unique voice and personal 
story is revealed, exhibiting her as a freely participating individual. Secondly in doing 
so, the pertinence of social disadvantage tends to be minimised. Thirdly, ambiguous 
admissions of guilt are translated as freely-given, full and sincere confessions. Fourthly, 
the person is manifested as a culpable offender ready for punishment.  The article 
considers new research agendas opened up by the implications of Ritual 
Individualisation. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
What do I mean by ‗Ritual Individualisation‘? In brief, Ritual Individualisation is a stylized, 
sequential, symbolically meaningful performance, requiring the shared and heightened 
attention of court professionals. Through its creative case-work, it manifests to the 
professional court community that the person proceeded against (defendant/convicted 
person)
1
 is treated as a unique individual who participates freely in the criminal process, 
which she regards as fair.  
 
1. Purpose 
I originate the concept of ‗Ritual Individualisation‘ so as better to understand the daily 
practices of the lower and intermediate criminal courts.
2
 It is not my intention in this article to 
take a normative stance, but rather to advance a deeper understanding of these daily practices. 
As professionals responsible for justice, lawyers and judges face every day a potentially 
troubling dilemma. How can cases be disposed of efficiently without violating the central 
legal norm of free choice and participation exercised by each unique defendant? I will explain 
how the practice of Ritual Individualisation resolves this dilemma. 
Since my purpose is to arouse fresh thinking, I acknowledge at the outset that the concept of 
Ritual Individualisation is incomplete in some important respects. For example, the shape is 
different in inquisitorial systems – a point returned to in the Conclusion. Nonetheless, by 
arousing fresh thinking, I seek to kindle conceptual and empirical development by fellow 
scholars about three key propositions. Firstly, the competing values of free participation by 
the unique individual and efficient case-disposal cannot be satisfactorily resolved by the self-
talk of individual professionals. Their resolution requires the manifestation of the defendant‘s 
participation and consent to her deserved punishment. Secondly, through the defendant‘s 
demonstrable participation and acceptance of the fairness of the process, the work of 
individualising processes tends to enable, rather than obstruct, expeditious case-disposal. 
Thirdly, individualisation-work achieves case-normalisation, thus managing the potential 
menace of ambiguous or seemingly defiant defendant postures.   
Importantly, successful Ritual Individualisation does not denote empty or meaningless 
gestures. Nor is it a charade or pretence, nor necessarily oppressive. Equally, it should it 
not be assumed that Ritual Individualisation is necessarily or invariably either inclusive or 
                                                          
1
 I use the term ‗person proceeded against‘ (or more simply ‗person‘) to cover a range of statuses including: 
‗defendant‘, ‗accused‘, ‗convicted person‘, ‗sentenced person‘ etc. Although the term ‗defendant‘ is used 
even after the person has pled guilty, it should not be taken too technically: this article is concerned with the 
ambiguous status of the person. 
2
 The term ‗lower and intermediate criminal courts‘ refers to the vast bulk (typically at least 90%) of first 
instance court cases. In most adversarial jurisdictions countries these are non-jury-triable (summary) cases.  
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degrading. Although such evaluative judgements are not the purpose of this article, effects 
on the person are likely to be contingent and variable.  
 
The ‗genius‘ character of Ritual Individualisation accomplishes status-change. By ‗genius‘ 
I am implying neither moral admiration nor sarcastic condemnation. Rather, I reclaim its 
older meaning: a creative, tutelary (i.e. protective, guardian) guiding force or spirit.
 3
  The 
creative work of Ritual Individualisation transforms and normalises cases, and in so doing, 
it protects and tutors cherished professional values. 
 
The article explains how Ritual Individualisation resolves the problem of the potential status-
ambiguity of the person proceeded against. The resolution of status-ambiguity is 
accomplished through case-normalisation, preparing and manifesting the person as suitable 
for the next stage in her journey: sentencing. She is transported to a new, settled and 
approved identity: a culpable offender who is regarded by the court as freely and sincerely 
accepting her impending punishment.
4
  
 
2. Doing Individualisation 
Having set out my purpose, let us begin by interrogating a fundamental dilemma facing the 
daily work of the lower and intermediate courts. How can cases be disposed of efficiently 
without violating the central legal norm of free choice and participation exercised by each 
unique individual defendant? A widespread academic and professional concern is that the 
values of participation and attendance to the unique individual are too often bulldozed by the 
sterile demands of system efficiency.
5
 By enabling the court to be informed about the unique 
individual appearing before it and allowing her personal, human story to be told, more 
humane, contextualised and tailored sentencing decision-making is made possible. 
Individualisation, (the investigation and presentation of the person as an individual), is widely 
seen as an essential to supplement to the narrow gaze of legal justice with an awareness of the 
role of social disadvantage, and allowing the person to give voice to the unique reality of her 
                                                          
3
 Although ‗genius‘ is now widely used to refer to virtuoso ability, here the paper recalls its older meaning 
from the Latin root ‗gignere‘ (i.e. beget) as a creative and tutelary, (i.e. protective, guardian), force or spirit. 
(OED 2001).   
4
 Whether or not and in what ways, the person proceeded against is partly or fully aware of this 
transformation is not the subject of this article, though it is a vital and neglected question. Often for 
pragmatic reasons (e.g. ethics and access), research has tended to neglect the longitudinal study of the 
subjective experiences of defendants/sentenced people, instead reporting the perceptions of professionals 
about they believe defendants/sentenced people experience.  
5
 See, for example, recently: J.Ward, ‗Transforming 'Summary Justice' through Police-led Prosecution and 
―Virtual Courts‖ – Is 'Procedural Due Process' Being Undermined?‘ (2015) 55 British Journal of Criminology 
341; L.Welsh The Effects of Changes to Legal Aid on Lawyers' Professional Identity and Behaviour in 
Summary Criminal Cases‘ (2017) 44 Journal of Law & Society 559; L.Welsh and M,Howard ‗Standardization 
and the Production of Justice in Summary Courts‘ (2019) 28 Social & Legal Studies, Advance Access; K.Franko 
Aas Sentencing in the Age of Information (2005). 
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life.
6
 It allows the person to have a voice in proceedings where, in the typical reality of guilty 
plea cases, the person‘s ‗voice‘, (her views about the process and her life-story), would not 
otherwise be heard. In adversarial systems the work of individualisation is conducted 
between conviction (typically via a guilty plea) and sentence. It is usually conducted through 
the defence lawyer‘s plea-in-mitigation work and the investigation and use of a pre-sentence 
report or similar individualising enquiry about the person. 
 
3. Who is Individualisation For? 
The virtues of system-efficiency and the voice of the unique individual are widely seen as 
mutually competing. The more attendance there is to the voice of the unique individual the 
less efficient the process is thought to be in getting through the list of cases and vice versa.  
Humanistic approaches, most notably Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ) and Procedural Justice 
(PJ), however, promise a happier resolution to this deadlock.  TJ
7
 and PJ
8
 propose, albeit in 
different ways, that fair and humane process (e.g. being treated as a unique individual; being 
listened to; having a voice etc), enhances the legitimacy of decision-making as perceived by 
those subject to it, thus smoothing efficient compliance. TJ and PJ hold out the chance of a 
win-win for individual fair treatment and efficient case-disposal. 
While not necessarily disputing the propositions of TJ and PJ, this article approaches 
individualisation differently. Rather than focusing on how individualisation boosts legitimacy 
in the eyes of those subject to the force of law, the article inverts the gaze. It asks how those 
responsible for law‘s force perceive individualisation in boosting participation, legitimacy, 
and thus compliance. As professionals who are the practical custodians of justice, judges and 
lawyers necessarily require signs of individualisation, (and concomitant participation and 
                                                          
6
 Individualisation prior to sentencing is almost universally regarded by scholars, judges, sentencing councils 
etc world-wide as an essential counterweight to the requirements of efficiency and consistency. (E.g. 
M.Nellis, ‗Humanising justice‘, in Handbook of Probation, ed. L.Gelsthorpe and R.Morgan (2007) 25). The 
importance of individualised justice shown to the participating person features prominently in moral penal 
philosophy (e.g. R.A.Duff, Trials and Punishment (1986)). Following Durkheim, H.Joas Punishment and 
Respect (2008) develops the idea of the ‗sacrality of the person‘ which is culturally central to the justification 
of punishment. The unique participating individual is a central trope in lawyer and judicial habitus, which is 
seen to balance consistency and efficiency. (E.g. P Bourdieu ‗The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the 
Juridical Field', (1987) Hastings Law Journal 38: 814—53; R Lenoir ‗A Living Reproach‘ (1999) in P 
Bourdieu et al The Weight of the World Stanford University Press 239-253; F.Jamieson, ‗Judicial 
Independence: the Master Narrative in Sentencing’ (2018) Criminology & Criminal Justice (2018 
forthcoming); N.Hutton ‗Sentencing as a Social Practice‘ in Perspectives on Punishment eds. S.Armstong 
and L.McAra (2006) 155; S. Roach Anleu and K.Mack Roach Anleu and K Mack Performing Judicial 
Authority in the Lower Courts (2017)). Honouring the idea of the unique participating individual can also be 
seen in codes of professional lawyer ethics and judicial conduct guides as well as trait models of professions 
exemplifying commitment to the individual case (e.g. T.H. Marshall ‗The Recent History of Professionalism 
in Relation to Social Structure and Social Policy‘ Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 
5(1939) 325; T Parsons Professions and Social Structure‘Social Forces 17 (1939) 457).  
7
 D. Wexler ‗New Wine in New Bottles: the Need to Sketch a Therapeutic Jurisprudence ―Code‘‘ of 
Proposed Criminal Processes and Practices‘ (2014) 7 Arizona Summit Law Review 463. 
8
 T.Tyler ‗Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law‘ 30 Crime and Justice 283-357; 
T.Tyler, and Y.Huo, Y (2002) Trust in the Law 
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acceptance of fairness), to be shown convincingly to them by those about to be subject to 
punishment. Illustrated by earlier sentencing research, I will suggest that in manifesting the 
voice of the unique person, practices of individualisation also demonstrate to the professional 
court community that the person is treated as a unique individual, who freely accepts the 
fairness of her impending punishment.  
 
4. Map of the Article 
The article proceeds as follows. Part II establishes why court professionals, (especially 
judges and defence lawyers
9
), necessarily have to care about the legitimacy of the process 
they constitute. It argues that the professional perception of the problematic gap between 
ideals and reality is managed by the enactment of social practices, not merely an internal 
dialogue of self-justification. This, Part III explains, is achieved through the transformative 
tri-partite work of Ritual Individualisation which, by individualising, normalises the 
representation of the person to the court. Part IV outlines and illustrates four key 
accomplishments of Ritual Individualisation. Concluding, Part V sums up before 
signposting future directions of research. 
Illustrating the concept and work of Ritual Individualisation, the article draws on research 
examining a key but under-explored moment in the adversarial criminal process: when the 
defendant who has pled (or been found) guilty presents to the court her story of the offence 
and attitude to the impending sentence. This enquiry into the individual‘s character, 
personal and social and circumstances, and especially her attitude to the offence to which 
she has formally pled guilty is a key moment when court professionals seek confirmation 
of her acceptance of the legitimacy of the court. On it pivots the question of whether or not 
her guilty plea truly represents a full, free and sincere acceptance of guilt. At stake is 
whether she accepts, or, challenges, (implicitly or explicitly), the fairness of the criminal 
process and thus the impending violence of sentencing. Through ethnographic study and 
                                                          
9
 Generally speaking, in nominally adversarial systems, responsibility for investigating and attending to the 
unique individual defendant bears particularly heavily on defence lawyers and judges, typically assisted by 
pre-sentence investigators (who may be social workers, probation officers or others from a range of 
backgrounds). This is not to deny that prosecutors play a part, and indeed their individualisation work is often 
much more central in nominally inquisitorial systems. (See for example: S. Field, ‗State, Citizen and 
Character in French Criminal Process‘ Journal of Law & Society 33 (2006) 522; S. Field, ‗―Ritual 
Individualisation‖ and French criminal justice: preliminary comparative observations‘ Paper presented to the 
Law & Society Association Conference, 2018; J.Hodgson, ‗Conceptions of the Trial in Inquisitorial and 
Adversarial Procedure‘ in A.Duff, L.Farmer, S. Marshall, V.Tadros (eds) The Trial on Trial (vol 2) (2006) 
223; J.Hodgson, and L.Soubise ‗Understanding the Sentencing Process in France‘ (2016) 45 Crime & Justice 
221). 
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‗shadow report-writing‘,10 court observations, judicial focus groups, interviews, and 
simulated sentencing hearings, the  multi-method research cited here followed the same 
cases from the construction of pre-sentence reports, through to their interpretation and use 
in the sentencing process. Conducted over four years, the study followed how individual 
reports are constructed, what the writer sought to convey and how sentencing judges and 
defence lawyers interpret and use those individual reports in intermediate court non-jury 
triable cases in Scotland.
11
  
 
 
II WHY JUDGES AND LAWYERS HAVE TO CARE ABOUT LEGITIMACY AND 
THEIR ‗GAP PROBLEM‘ 
The international research literature on the lower and intermediate criminal courts has 
long established that it is orientated to the high-volume throughput and disposal of 
cases, standardisation, and speed; the minimisation of uncertainty; the value of court 
workgroups or communities; the maintenance of inter- and intra-professional relations; 
and the avoidance of conflict.
12
 Speed and routinisation seem to be privileged over the 
unique stories of individuals. What is important to everyone is the ‗efficient‘ disposal of 
cases (i.e. disposing of as many cases as possible with as little effort as possible). 
Defendant docility and acquiescence are facilitated and encouraged in the lower and 
                                                          
10
 S.Halliday, N.Burns, N.Hutton, F.McNeill, C.Tata, ‗Shadow Writing and Participant Observation‘ Journal 
of Law and Society 35 (2008) 189; C.Tata, N.Burns, S.Halliday, N.Hutton, and F.McNeill  'Assisting and 
advising the sentencing decision process' (2008) British Journal of Criminology 48 (2008) 835. 
11
 The research incorporated four elements: 1.An ethnographic study of the construction of pre-sentence 
reports in two sites in Scotland. This deployed the use of ‗shadow‘ report-writing in which the field-based 
researcher prepared a ‗shadow‘ (i.e. mock) report based on the same information available to the pre-
sentence report writer who prepared the real report. This elicited a comparison between the ‗shadow‘ report 
and the real report (Halliday et al, id). 2. An observational and interview court-based study of the use of these 
same (and other) cases, with interviews with the sentencing judges, defence lawyers and prosecutors.  3. A 
series of focus group discussions with intermediate court judges throughout Scotland discussing general and 
specific issues in using specific pre-sentence reports, pleas in mitigation etc. 4. A series of simulated 
sentencing hearings with pre- and post-interviews with intermediate court judges and defence lawyers using 
anonymized case papers whose production and sentencing had already been observed. ESRC Award Number 
RB000239939. 
12
 For example: J Baldwin and M McConville, Negotiated Justice (1977); K Cheng, ‗The Practice and 
Justifications of Plea Bargaining by Hong Kong Criminal Defence Lawyers‘ Asian Journal of Law & Society 
1(2014) 395; M Feeley, The Process is the Punishment (1979); M Heumann Plea Bargaining (1978); M 
Heumann, ―A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure‖ Law and Society Review 9 (1975) 515;  J. 
Jacobson, G Hunter, A Kirby Inside Crown Court (2015); L.Mather, Plea Bargaining or Trial (1979); D 
McBarnet Conviction (1981); P. Thomas ‗Plea Bargaining in England‘ Journal of Criminal Law & 
Criminology 69 (1978)170; A.Mulcahy,  ‗The justifications of justice‘ British Journal of Criminology, 34 
(1994)411; C Tata (2007) ‗In the Interests of Clients or Commerce? Legal Aid, Supply, Demand, and 
‗Ethical Indeterminacy‘ in Criminal Defence Work‘ Journal of Law & Society 34(2007) 489 
7 
 
intermediate courts by a pervasive culture of presumed guilt enveloped in a disposition 
of case-triviality.
13
  
So far, so relatively simple. However, court professionals (especially lawyers and 
judges), can, in varying ways, be confronted with a potential degree of uncertainty, 
awkwardness or doubt about the gap between venerated Rule of Law values to which 
they must, at some level, subscribe as opposed to the disappointing daily reality of high-
volume case-disposal. These venerated values include ‗the golden thread‘14 of the 
presumption of innocence; free and informed choice by the defendant; fair opportunity 
for the defendant to participate in her own case; legal equality; consistency balanced 
with judging each case as a unique individual. 
In necessarily subtle and implied ways, court professionals may observe their own 
embarrassment or awkwardness. Typically, they allude to unease in not having as much 
time as they would like to really get to grips with individual cases. Not surprisingly, this 
observation is more readily made about the work of other professionals, than their own 
personal work.
15
 When it is acknowledged, it is expressed in relatively muted and 
awkward terms. For example:  
―On a practical level sometimes you don‘t have as much time when you‘re doing 
summary criminal legal aid work as you perhaps should have with individuals […It is] 
is a poor admission, but this reflects reality of working in a busy sort of summary 
[intermediate] court.‖  [Interview defence lawyer16] 
Similarly, in their advice to novices, judges and lawyers signal the pragmatic need 
quickly to come to terms with the disappointing reality of daily criminal work.
17
 Here 
we can see the professional discomfort about what scholars call ‗the gap problem‘: the 
gap between the ideals of law and its everyday reality: between what ought to be and 
                                                          
13
 For example: Baldwin and McConville, id; Feeley, id; Jacobson et al id; McBarnet id; Mulcahy, A. (1994) 
‗The justifications of justice‘ British Journal of Criminology, 34(4): 411–430; K.Mack and S.Roach Anleu 
‗Getting through the list‘Social and Legal Studies 16 (2007) 341. 
14
 Woolmington v DPP 1935 articulated the idea of the presumption of innocence as ‗the golden thread‘: the 
precious, binding and supreme principle of the criminal process. Even if it is alleged that in reality a 
presumption of guilt pervades lower and intermediate court-work, for a lawyer or judge openly and plainly to 
deny the value of the presumption of innocence would also be to deny his/her own validity. 
15
 We should not expect judges and lawyers openly to speak of a sense of inadequacy about their own work. 
To do so would be to undermine their professional claims to ethicality, public service and individual 
responsibility (Tata, op cit (2007a) n.10 ).  
16
 C Tata, N Burns, S Halliday, N. Hutton, and F. McNeill  'Assisting and advising the sentencing decision 
process: the pursuit of 'quality' in pre-sentence reports' (2008) British Journal of Criminology 48(6):835-855 
17
 For example: Feeley; Heumann 175, 1978; McConville et al; Tata 2007a op cit, n.12. Nevertheless, 
lawyers and judges they cannot simply deny the value of these elevated principles. The application of 
abstract, esoteric knowledge (e.g. legal principles) is key to the claims of professions and their work (cf A 
Abbott The System of Professions (1988) 
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what is. In accounts which may occasionally be nostalgic, the common complaint 
among judges and lawyers is not having as much time as they would like to get grips 
with individual cases: of ‗running on empty‘; feeling ‗under the pump‘18; in an 
assembly line process, a sausage machine, a factory of mass case-disposal necessitated 
by overwhelming case-volume. While such complaints are not new and indeed may not 
necessarily be wholly objectively true
19
, they voice the frustration that the high ideals of 
the Rule of Law have to be scarified to the demands of mechanical system-efficiency.  
How is the perceived gap between daily assembly-line practice and cherished legal 
principles reconciled?   
 
1. How is the Potential Felt Gap Problem Reconciled? 
In seeking to explain how the perceived gap is addressed, previous work has 
concentrated on how the gap is explained by individual practitioners, through 
techniques of internal self-justification. For example, the importance of most cases is 
often said to be too low to merit a contested trial. Cases may be derided as ‗rubbish‘, 
‗dross‘, ‗crap‘, ‗nonsense‘,20 enveloped in an ‗ideology of triviality‘21 and a pervasive 
presumption of guilt.
22
   Here, some of the propositions of Sykes and Matza‘s famous 
work on juvenile delinquents
23
 explaining how they justify their transgressions has been 
applied to the explanations of judicial sentencers. For example, Tombs and Jagger
24
 
argue that, like Sykes and Matza‘s delinquents, judicial sentencers neutralise potential 
criticisms by justifying and excusing their decisions to imprison relatively non-
dangerous people through a series of internal denials (e.g. denying responsibility for 
one‘s decisions; telling oneself that there is no alternative etc).  
While not disputing that an internal and inter-personal dialogue of self-justification 
plays an important role in sentencing work, my contention is that there is much more to 
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 Roach Anleu and Mack Roach Anleu, op cit, n.6 
19
 From both international and historical perspectives the link between plea bargaining and caseload pressure 
appears rather tenuous (e.g. Feeley, op.cit. n.12; Heumann 1975, 1978; op. cit., n.12).  
20
 Heumann, op. cit., n12; Mulchay, op. cit, n.8; D Newman, D ‗Still Standing Accused: addressing the gap 
between work and talk in firms of criminal defence lawyers‘ (2012) International Journal of the Legal 
Profession   19(1): 3-27. 
21
 McBarnet, op cit, n.12. 
22
 Cheng, op. cit., n 12; Feeley, op. cit., n12; M.McConville and M.Marsh (2014) Criminal Judges: 
legitimacy, courts and state-induced guilty pleas in Britain; McBarnet op cit n12; Mulcahay op cit n 12; 
Newman op cit n20; A Sanders, and R.Young Criminal Justice p.443; Tata 2007 op. cit., n 12.  
23
 G Sykes and D Matza Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency (1957) American 
Sociological Review 22(6) 664-670; see also S.Maruna and H.Copes ‗What Have we Learned from Five 
Decades of Neutralization Research?‘ 32(2005) Crime and Justice 221. 
24
 J Tombs, and E Jagger  ‗Denying Responsibility: Sentencers‘ Accounts of their Decisions to Imprison‘ 
(2006) British Journal of Criminology 46(2006) 803 
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it than that. The comparison with juvenile delinquents is weak. For three reasons, the 
self-awareness of relatively high social-status and professional responsibility demands 
an enacted resolution which is shown to judges and lawyers.  
First, judges and lawyers have every day to face at close-quarters the palpable suffering 
of most people coming before them. That face-to-face encounter requires justification
25
, 
especially where one knows one is immediately responsible for another person: a deeper 
responsibility than faced by Sykes and Matza‘s juvenile delinquents. The evident 
distress of another human being whom I have to face, particularly when I am aware I 
have the direct ability to alleviate that distress, demands that I account for my actions. 
Failure to do so leads to uncertainty and doubt, (the bête-noir of expeditious case 
disposal), a kind of debilitating paralysis.
26
 Especially in the lower and intermediate 
courts, professionals are starkly reminded every day of their immediate duty to consider 
the desperate plight of people about whom they have to make decisions. As one judicial 
sentencer put it, they are faced with a relentless parade of human misery: 
― ‗If you‘ve got any feelings at all, you‘re seeing absolute misery passing in front of 
you day in, day out, month in, month out, year in, year out; you‘re seeing women with 
young kids having to go to jail, you‘re seeing young - you know, young men in their 
mid twenties who ought to be in the absolute prime of their life just raddled by drugs 
and alcohol and coming into court with terrible injuries from fights and teeth missing, 
and you see mentally affected people, people who are schizoid and paranoid through 
overuse of drugs, all of this misery, day in, day out.‘‖27  
Secondly, lawyers and professional judges, (who are lawyers by background
28
 and 
‗habitus‘),29 tend to regard themselves as exemplars of the ‗trait model‘ of the 
professions. Although in the academy approaches to the power of professions
30
 have 
long-taken a critical turn, legal professional self-identity tends to be based on a more 
benign understanding of professional work centred on honour, altruism and duty.
31
 
Among its defining features, this trait model of professions guarantees ethical and 
                                                          
25
 cf  E.Goffman ‗On Face-Work‘ (1967) essay in Interaction Ritual 
26
 E Levinas Totality and Infinity 1961 
27
 Roach Anleu and Mack, op. cit., n.6. 
28
 Variations in judicial background and habitus are important. Although in most of the English-speaking 
world most criminal cases are heard by judges who are drawn from the ranks of practising lawyers, in 
England and Wales most cases are heard by lay people (lay magistrates).  
29
 Bourdieu op. cit., n6; R Lenoir op. cit.,n6. 
30
 Abbott, op. cit., n 17; T.Johnson, Professions and Power (1972) 
31
 Marshall op. cit., n.6; Parsons op cit. n.6; H Sommerlad ‗The ―Social Magic‖ of Merit‘ (2015) Fordham 
Law Review 87:3225-2347. 
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altruistic behaviour in which the best interests of the client and public service are 
paramount, trumping narrow personal (e.g. pecuniary) self-interest.
32
    
In his influential essay extolling the sentiments of professional self-identity, TH 
Marhsall observed that professional service must be ―supported by individual 
responsibility which cannot be shifted on to the shoulders of others‖.33 Despite its 
collaborative character, the claim to be ‗a professional‘ necessitates a sense of enacting 
unavoidable, personal, individual moral duty. The professional ―does not give only his 
skills. He gives himself….[A legal professional] is called upon to show judgement and 
an understanding of human nature, as well as knowledge of […] law‖.34 The sense of 
duty in honourably carrying out one‘s inescapable individual and personal responsibility 
in service of the client and/or of the public is a central organising lens through which 
lawyers and judges prefer to see themselves.
35
 Indeed, it is one from which they 
successfully claim considerable honour,
36
 social status and moral elevation.
37
 For 
judges, sentencing is particularly difficult because, though collaborative
38
, it is 
nevertheless experienced, through the ‗master narrative‘ of judicial independence, as a 
solitary, unavoidable, personal burden, weighing heavily in judicial consciousness
39
.   
Thirdly, because professions seek ownership of a territory of social problems
40
, 
sentencing is jealously guarded by lawyers and judges as an area of work which belongs 
to them. Lawyers and especially judges are expected, and (albeit expressed in variable 
ways) expect themselves, to be the practical custodians of justice.  
Thus, as legal professionals, judges and lawyers have to regard themselves, albeit in 
varying ways, as carrying a triple-burden of duty: first, as human beings aware of their 
direct ability to alleviate the palpable distress of those they are faced with everyday; 
secondly, as professionals ethically and dutifully serving their client and/or the public; 
and, thirdly, as the practical custodians of justice. Accordingly, legal professionals have 
to regard themselves enacting a process which is just and legitimate, or at least not 
decidedly unjust and illegitimate. The threat of doubt and uncertainty cannot be 
resolved merely by asserting that cases are inconsequential, nor, that one is not truly 
responsible. Internal dialogues of self-deception are neither necessary nor sufficient. 
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 Parsons, id. 
33
 Marshall, op cit, n6, p.331. 
34
 Marshall, id, p.328, emphasis added. 
35
 Abbott, op cit, n.17 ; Tata, op cit, n.12 
36
 Sommerlad, op cit, n.31 
37
 Bourdieu, op cit, n.6; S. Roach Anleu Law and Social Change (2009) 
38
 C.Tata ‗Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the Discretionary Decision Process‘ 
Social & Legal Studies 16 (2007) 425 
39
 Jamieson, op. cit., n.6. 
40
 Abbott, op cit, n.17; C Tata et al, op cit, n.10 
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Rather, by witnessing and participating in the enactment of individualisation processes, 
legal professionals can observe the person freely and sincerely acknowledging her 
culpability and more or less accepting the fairness of her impending punishment. Thus, 
court professionals are, through their collaborative work, able, literally, to see 
expeditious case-disposal as compatible with the venerated values of free choice and 
participation by the unique individual.  
By both witnessing and participating in its collective performance
41
, judges and lawyers 
experience the enacted individualisation of the person. Such enactment is deeper and 
more convincing than is possible through an internal dialogue of self-justification. 
Explaining David Hume‘s premonitory approach to understanding the making of moral 
judgements as a social practice, Sparks observes neatly that the deeper creators of 
morality are found in ―neither introspection nor rule following… It is only in 
communication that we are able to render our inchoate initial feelings into calmer, 
‗corrected‘ standards or principles.‖42 Even in the lower and intermediate courts, court 
professionals can, and must, at least to some degree, genuinely believe in the venerated 
values with which they identify: free choice and participation by the unique individual. 
They can believe in these values at the same time as seeking speedy case-disposal 
because these values are not simply espoused, but, through individualisation practices, 
they are seen to be enacted by the person and shown to the court.  
However low-key summary justice may be compared to the majesty of the higher 
courts, court professionals are faced every day with implied challenges to the legitimacy 
of the process which they embody. Through these moments of explicit and, more 
commonly, implicit resistance, the legitimacy of the criminal process is seen to be 
tested, and through the practices of individualisation, revalidated, re-energising a sense 
of professional values, identity and belonging. So how is potential doubt and 
uncertainty about the legitimacy of the criminal process addressed is through the 
creative and protective practices of Ritual Individualisation?  
 
III THE WORK OF RITUAL INDIVIDUALISATION 
1. Taking Ritual Seriously 
                                                          
41
 Judges, lawyers and other court actors are, at the same time, both participants and each other‘s audience 
(for example: L Baum Judges and Their Audiences (2006); C Tata, ‗Accountability for the Sentencing 
Decision Process –Towards a New Understanding‘ (2002) in C Tata and N Hutton (eds) Sentencing and 
Society: International Perspectives pp399-428 
42
 R. Sparks ‗Divided Sympathies: David Hume and Contemporary Criminology‘ in S Karstedt, I Loader, H 
Strang (eds) Emotions, Crime and Justice (2014) 317 at p.323-5, emphasis added. 
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The evidentially-contested criminal trial in the higher courts is easily conceived as ritual 
par excellence.
43
  However, in the hum-drum reality of the intermediate and lower 
courts, where an evidentially-contested trial is relatively rare, it is widely said that cases 
are simply disposed in routinised, sterile, mechanical ways.
44
 Unlike the drama and 
emotional energy of the higher courts, it may be supposed that there is no need for the 
performance of ritual since the driving imperative is simply expeditious case-disposal.
45
  
Yet high drama and pomp are not essential to successful ritual. In its relatively low-key 
form such ritual is, nonetheless, central to expeditious case-disposal work in the lower 
and intermediate courts. 
Let us think about the meaning of ritual. Among legal and criminological scholars, 
mention of ‗ritual‘ can evoke instantaneous normative reactions. These reactions may 
colour empirical conceptualisations of the criminal process as ritual. Ritual can be 
regarded with suspicion, even hostility, synonymised as irrational, meaningless 
repetition, degrading, fake and secretive. For example, Garfinkel‘s classic short essay is 
commonly represented as compelling evidence that ritual is synonymous with human 
degradation.
46
 In response, others argue for the normative benefits of ritual (e.g. its 
socially-inclusive and restorative power).
47
 However, both effects on the person may be 
true.  Normative preoccupations about the pitfalls and promises of specific ritual 
practices should not lead us to fear or valorise ritual per se. In itself, ritual is neither 
inherently a ‗good‘ nor ‗a bad thing‘. Ritual is simply indelible to and inextricable from 
social life. Ritual practices are unavoidable. Thus, normative evaluation is better 
focused on the processes and results of specific ritual practices. For that reason, let us 
first examine the work ritual does in the criminal-penal process before beginning to 
focus on the normative implications.    
 
2.  What Does Ritual Do? 
Ritual enacts meaning and classification of the world. Through its performance, it 
locates human activity within the wider natural order of the cosmos, constituting and 
                                                          
43
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reproducing social community, belief and belonging by classifying and dividing the 
sacred as opposed to the profane.
48
  The precise definition of ritual is contested.
49
 
Nevertheless, it can be conceived as having certain key ‗family‘ resemblances. These 
include ritual practice being: recursive; symbolically meaningful; aesthetically elevated; 
formalised and stylised sequential, rhythmical social activity; spatially and temporally 
framed. It is a meaningful performance which achieves action to address a perceived 
social problem. In so doing, ritual addresses the potential threats of doubt about 
venerated ideas which are core to the constitution of group identity.  
Ritual addresses a perceived collective problem; attended by an audience, whose 
emotional attention is demanded.
50
 Successful ritual practice helps to resolve 
discrepancy between sacred ideals and the messiness of everyday life. ―Why do we 
engage in seemingly pointless rituals? Rituals appear to perform a crucial, cathartic 
function when individuals are facing epistemically threatening life events, especially 
transitions and turning points‖51. ―Effective ritual is the solution to a seemingly 
insoluble problem, the management of collectively held, otherwise unmanageable 
distress.‘‖ 52 
Successful rituals produce ―a momentarily shared reality, which generates solidarity and 
symbols of group membership‖53. In successful ritual practices participants, (who are 
also its audience), genuinely believe in the transformation of its subject. Ritual secures 
beliefs and belonging against doubt-producing ambiguities and uncertainties.
54
 Far from 
being empty, or, a pretence, successful ritual enacts ideals convincingly by performing 
the resolution of problems. Seen in this way, communities are sustained and invigorated 
by collectively paying homage to their symbols of sacred ideals and beliefs. By 
addressing the problem of status-ambiguity and beholding its resolution, communities 
fortify social solidarity and feelings of communal well-being. In ritual‘s successful 
management of a perceived problem, what is being tested and celebrated is not simply 
the activity in itself, but the validity of shared beliefs and social solidarity.
55
 ―Rituals do 
honour to what is socially valued.‖56     
                                                          
48
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Taking part and witnessing performance is tutelary. Participation in socially-enacted 
practices ensures deeper faith in ideals and sacred symbols than is ever possible through 
solitary, individual reflection. ―A ritual draws power through participation. Belief 
follows action even if it did not precede action.‖57 Participation in successful ritual is far 
from being a pretence. The immediacy of social situations demands that we perform 
according to ―the demands of sociality in the here-and-now‘‖58. Beliefs and feelings are 
performed, enacted and embodied, generated through ritual, not simply through 
individual abstract reasoning.  Participation in the showing of a ritual demands the 
attentiveness of its participants. Ritual efficacy depends not just on the doing of a ritual, 
but upon the showing of that doing, by, in some sense, taking part and so contributing to 
its resolution. Let us now think about how these ideas may help to explain 
individualisation-work in the criminal-penal process. 
 
3. Ritual Individualisation in the Criminal Process 
In the lower and intermediate criminal courts the central collective problem facing 
justice professionals is how to dispose of cases with minimum effort and in a way which 
is consistent with the venerated professional values of close attention to the unique 
individual who freely participates. This problem is addressed through the work of 
individualisation.  
Let us recall that the criminal process is also a process of normalisation. Research has 
established the claim that each person is treated as a unique individual and that each 
case turns on its own facts to be a cognitive and cultural impossibility. Cases are created 
and transformed; facts are selected, edited and constructed; stories are typified; the 
unique is normalised: rendered familiar and easily recognisable.
59
 The ideal norm to 
which the defendant should approximate is one who exhibits full, sincere, and free 
admission of individual guilt, an informed and rational decision-maker who accepts her 
culpability, but is perhaps seen to benefit from some degree of mitigation by a humane 
process.  The defendant is seen to have participated; her unique voice has been listened 
to and is seen to comply with (better still co-author) her own fate.   
                                                          
57
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A straight, unambiguous denial of guilt tends to be unwelcome. However, what is more 
awkward and troubling is the non-ideal defendant who formally pleads guilty, but 
whose position is taken by court professionals to query (explicitly or implicitly) the 
legitimacy of the process. This includes the person who exhibits: a contradictory (e.g. 
exculpatory), or, an insincere admission of guilt,
60
 equivocal guilty plea
61
, or, obvious 
disengagement, cynicism, reluctant conformity, or, ‗passive acceptance‘62; or, is 
palpably not an informed, rational decision-maker.  This manifested ambiguity and 
doubt about the voluntariness and sincerity of the formal admission of guilt cannot be 
ignored. If court professionals are to believe in their work as fair and legitimate, it 
cannot be left as it is. Change is required in the person‘s posture to that of a culpable 
offender who is seen to show a full and sincere admission of guilt.
63
  
Ritual achieves the transition from one displayed category of social status to another.  In 
the criminal-penal process, ritual practices change the person‘s uncertain status from a 
defendant whose innocence is formally presumed, but whose avowal appears to be less 
than wholehearted, to that of a culpable offender who is shown sincerely and completely 
to accept her own punishment.  This manifested status-change is accomplished through 
a specific form of ritual: a rite of passage.
64
   
 
(a) Criminal-Penal Process as a Rite of Passage 
At first blush the idea of the criminal process as a ‗rite of passage‘ may seem strange. 
We tend to think of rites of passage as denoting a positive step forward in some way, 
their successful completion being a matter for communal excitement and celebration. 
Life-course events (entry e.g. to the world (birth), adulthood, marriage, the after-life 
(death) are perhaps the best-known examples. It may seem strange, then, to see as a rite 
of passage the conversion of an ambiguous defendant to a culpable offender. However, 
what really counts is not so much any chronological or biological change, but the 
cultural conferment of change in social status. A rite of passage is a journey which 
accomplishes a socially approved change of identity. The defendant whose presentation, 
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despite her formal admission of guilt, is seen to raise explicit or implicit questions about 
the freeness or sincerity of her formal admission presents the professional court 
community with an acute problem.  Transformation from that ambiguous and doubtful 
status to the settled status of ‗culpable offender‘ who is seen freely and sincerely to 
admit her true culpability is, from the perspective of professional court communities, 
socially desirable and approved.
65
  
So how does this rite of passage transition the ascribed status of the person from doubt-
inducing ambiguity to the certainty of a ‗culpable offender‘? van Gennep and Turner66 
proposed that all rites of transition are marked by a tripartite process: first, ―symbolic 
behaviour signifying detachment of the individual‖67 from the normal populaton; 
secondly, margin (or limen) requiring a limited period of seclusion and ‗pupation’, and 
third, with this new social identity aggregation into a definable social group or category. 
Bell explains that the social anthropology of van Gennep identified: 
―[A] three-stage sequence: separation, transition, reincorporation. Through this 
sequence of activities, rituals effect the person‘s removal from one social grouping, 
dramatize the change by holding the person in a suspended betwixt and between state 
for a period of time, and then reincorporate him or her into a new identity and status 
within another social grouping. The first stage, separation, is often marked by rites of 
purification and symbolic allusions to the loss of the old identity (in effect, to the death 
of the old self): the person is bathed, hair is shaved, clothes are switched, marks are 
made on the body, and so on. In the second stage the person is kept in a place that is 
symbolically outside the conventional sociocultural order (akin to a gestation period): 
normal routines are suspended while rules distinctive to this state are carefully 
followed …. In the third stage, symbolic acts of incorporation focus on welcoming the 
person into a new status…‖68 
Let us consider how this tri-partite framework can help us to understand how successful 
status-transformation is achieved.  
 
(i) The First-Phase.   
The first-phase is preparatory (arrest, bail, charge and ‗not guilty‘ plea). At this time, 
there is a heightened display of formal due process, especially the presumption of 
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innocence. The first-phase is symbolic separation from the normal community, often 
marked by ―symbolic allusions to the loss of the old identity (in effect, to the death of 
the old self).‖69 The defendant is shown to have entered a special zone, which in the 
adversarial system is blind to her individual characteristics and social situation. It is a 
phase of waiting in which time and space are the property of the process.
70
 Formally 
neutral, in reality this waiting and separation subjects the person to ‗process costs‘.71  
Yet at the same time, informally, the defendant‘s prospects at sentencing are presaged, 
heralding the opportunity for individualisation, concomitant humanity and mitigation, 
but only if a guilty plea is tendered. The defendant who chooses to maintain the high-
risk option of a ‗not guilty‘ plea denies herself the opportunity to reduce the prosecution 
charges. Instead she has to anticipate the likelihood of more severe sentencing 
consequences of such a plea if she is found guilty at trial.  
This first-phase in the rite of passage of the non-ideal defendant ends when a formal 
guilty plea is attained. However, this may not be accompanied by convincing signs of 
full, free and sincere admission of culpability. This is achieved in the second-phase. 
 
(b) The Second-Phase.  
The second-phase is the key transitional period of ‗pupation‘72 or ‗gestation‘73 in the 
journey of the problematic person. The person is no longer a defendant formally 
presumed innocent, but neither can she, as yet, be regarded as a culpable and punishable 
offender until she is seen to express more or less full, free and sincere admission of 
culpability. Her status is uncertain, ambiguous and troubling: neither one thing nor 
another. She is ‗betwixt and between‘ two acceptable identities. She does not fit any 
approved classification. She is neither a formally innocent defendant, nor can she, as 
yet, be shown to be a culpable offender, whose sentence can seen to be deserved. For 
example, her account may be ambiguous, or, seen to be at odds with the formal plea; 
palpably confused; explicitly, or, more often, implicitly defiant; exculpatory; or tactical 
in some way. This second ‗pupation‘, or, ‗gestation‘ phase resolves the ambiguous 
status of the person 
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Following a formal guilty plea accomplished in the first-phase, at the start of the 
second-phase there remains a display of strict equality and uniformity of treatment. At 
the start of this liminal phase, before individualising examination (e.g. pre-sentence 
investigation, plea in mitigation) begins, ―persons are said to have no status, property, 
insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship position, nothing to demarcate them structurally 
from their fellows.‖74  
Yet at the same time as this blindness to individual character and social position is 
displayed front-of-stage in court, simultaneously there is the back-stage preparation of 
the possibility of mitigation on the condition that she fully and freely admits guilt and 
exhibits cooperation. This opportunity may often help to achieve status-pupation into 
the culpable offender who will be seen to give a willing, closed and unambiguous 
account of her guilt.  By preparing her for individualising examination, her seemingly 
contradictory position is discussed, (typically with the defence lawyer), with reference 
to sentencing expectations. Of key concern is the danger of maintaining a posture which 
may be seen to present a challenge (whether explicitly or more often implicitly) to the 
legitimacy of the process.  
Through the promise of mitigation, the individualising examination in the second-phase 
solicits the person‘s account. It converts disengagement into active participation; 
transmutes disingenuous to sincere admission of guilt; mutates postures of exculpation 
to admissions of culpability; transfigures resistance to apparent acceptance; and 
transforms the ambiguous liminal subject into a manifestly culpable offender, who is 
seen to accept the legitimacy of the imminent punishment.  
Paradoxically, then, the process and content of individualising examination tends to 
solicit and yield normalisation. As Foucault observes, examination about the individual 
cannot be accomplished without some comparison to the norm (at the same time 
constituting the norm):    
―[I]t refers individuals to a whole, that is at once a field of comparison, a space of 
differentiation and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals 
from one another, in terms of the following rule: that the rule be made to function as a 
minimal threshold, as an average to be respected, or as an optimum toward which one 
must move…..[It] compares, differentiates, hireachizes, homogenizes, excludes. In 
short it normalises.‖75  
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(c) The Third-Phase.  
The third-phase consummates the transition of the ritual subject.
76
 It declares with 
confidence the person‘s new settled criminal identity as a guilty, punishable offender 
who is shown to have been given a voice, listened to her unique life story. In explaining 
her offending she freely admits the truth of her culpability. The person can then be 
shown to be incorporated into her new world, seen to begin serving her sentence as a 
culpable and fairly-sentenced offender, who is now amenable to the possibility of 
rehabilitation.
77
  
In their understated expressions of professional pride in a job well done, we can see 
(and in illustrations below) a quiet celebration among court professionals of the 
accomplishment of this transition. For example, judges tend to recall incidents of how 
despite having received a significant sentence, the person acknowledges the judge‘s 
fairness. A judge or defence lawyer may observe with understated pleasure that their 
rapport with and individualised treatment of the person boosts her self-esteem. Judges 
may tend to be gently amused by the weight of ‗excessive‘ individualised information 
reported to them about the person to be sentence: absolutely everything about the person 
has been covered. Court professionals tend to observe the reaction of the sentenced 
person as she leaves the court-room, noting signs of acceptance or resistance. Indeed, 
signs of remorse are sought by court professionals, at least in part, precisely because 
they are the ultimate exemplar of complete, free and sincere acceptance of culpability 
and the court‘s impending punishment: so much so that through her remorse the person 
is seen to be punishing herself.
78
 
Having outlined its three-phase process, let us now outline and illustrate four specific 
accomplishments of Ritual Individualisation.   
 
 
IV FOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF RITUAL INDIVIDUALISATION 
Here I suggest four accomplishments of the protective, tutelary and creative genius of 
Ritual Individualisation.  
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1. The Display of Listening to the Voice of the Unique Individual Re-Presents   
Disengaged Postures as Participation and Acceptance 
In nominally adversarial systems, investigation about the individual is conducted in the 
second-phase: after the first-phase of conviction typically as a result of a guilty plea, but 
prior to sentence. In conducting this examination through the defence lawyer‘s plea-in-
mitigation work and/or pre-sentence investigation, it is seen to give the person fair 
opportunity to participate and tell her unique story. In this way, two central but 
opposing ideas are seen to be respected:  attention to the unique individual counter-
balances the need for consistency in the expeditious mass disposal of cases. For 
example:  
―you‘re putting before the judge what you would describe as a sort of generic  fabric 
within which you‘re going to address, so he has a sort of feel for the human being 
before him.   And it makes the procedures slightly more humane.‖ [Interview, defence 
lawyer 8] 
 
(a) Individualisation is Felt to Enhance the Person’s Self-Esteem 
Defence lawyers rely on individual pre-sentence investigations and reports not only to 
gain valuable information about the client to put to the court. Current and previous 
reports can also be put to use in the first-phase or second-phase of the rite of passage so 
as to develop rapport with a client. Defence lawyers can themselves harvest the 
commercial value of such individualised inquiries. They tend to reassure the client and 
so her lawyer, that the client is being treated humanely as an individual. Some lawyers 
consciously use it as a way of demonstrating to clients, and to themselves, that they 
know them to be unique individuals. In some defence firms, lawyers remember the 
unique details of clients‘ lives (ironically described below as ‗run of the mill routine 
data‘) via a client database: 
Defence Lawyer: A bit of rapport.  Most clients actually, the complaint they have 
when they see someone who they haven‘t seen before is that, ‗you don‘t know my 
case.‘  […] We keep the [pre-sentence] reports and we store them on a database […] 
And it‘s extremely helpful when a client comes in and you haven‘t seen the client for a 
year […].  We can withdraw the […] report and in two minutes flat, you have a full 
history of your client and you can then speak to the client on the basis that – ‗How‘s 
your child getting on? How‘s this, that, the next thing? How are you getting on?‘  So 
you know exactly what the client history is.  Everybody in the office actually has a 
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very full and detailed picture of the client and you get it - it‘s just immediate. […] If 
I‘m sending a lawyer to a prison and the lawyer‘s not seen the client  before, he gets 
an old […] report.  By the time he hits the prison, he can speak to this client as if he‘s 
known him for a hundred years and he can also speak to the client in the sense that the 
client recognises that this lawyer has shown an interest: ‘this [lawyer] knows about 
me’.[…] And most reports are quite exceptional when it comes to recording that 
information. […] It makes an immense [difference to] the client actually: you also 
enhance his esteem.   [Interview, defence lawyer 8] 
Here, then, the person has been shown to the defence lawyer as having been respected 
as a unique individual who, rather than feeling degraded by the indifference of a 
mechanical system, has had his/her esteem enhanced by its individualisation. Happily, 
this is thought to mean greater co-operation and satisfaction: a win-win for legitimacy 
and efficiency.  
 
(b) The Complaint of ‘Excessive’ Individual Information also Serves to Underline  
Fairness  
Although research has shown that far from simply conveying detailed and neutral 
information about individuals, pre-sentence reports are edited, purposive and 
normalising constructions,
79
 lawyers and judges tend to depict them as a 
comprehensive, ‗biographical‘, ‗encyclopaedic‘ examination of the individual. This is 
often articulated as a gentle complaint. Reports about the individual are, it is said, so 
thorough to the point of excess.  In this way, judges and lawyers delight in recounting 
the absurd lengths to which reports are said to go in documenting the individual: 
whether it be the nature of the individual‘s birth or his/her golf handicap, or, educational 
attainment.  
Normally judges, (and so defence lawyers), skip read the (constructed) sections about 
the individual which are dismissed as ‗background‘ or ‗encyclopaedic‘. Yet, this ‗detail‘ 
is also regarded as essential. Where a report does not include such ‗detail‘ it is believed 
to have failed in its task:  ―It was a bit lacking, I think. […] It‘s a bit thin.‖ [Post moot 
interview judge 3].  Judges, defence lawyers need to feel the weight of this 
individualised investigation in order that they can (often if not always) be assured it has 
been addressed and so move ahead to completing the disposal of the case. This, in turn, 
has important implications for the role of information about social inequality and 
disadvantage, to which we now turn.  
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2. Individualised Examination Minimises the Impact of Social Disadvantage  
Individualising examination exhibits close attendance to the importance of social 
context, disadvantage and inequality. Yet, in doing so, it tends to minimise and nullify 
it. By exhibiting the depth and comprehensiveness of the back-stage investigation into 
the deprivation and disadvantage of defendant lives, it is then seen to have been 
addressed. 
In the second phase of Ritual Individualisation, the display of awareness of social 
inequality through indvidualised information evidences the court‘s awareness and 
sensitivity to the context of the lives of those before it. Yet the individualised character 
of this information also means that systemic factors (e.g. poverty and disadvantage) are 
maginalised. Because the effects of poverty are so pervasive in cases brought before the 
criminal courts, it is felt to make little difference to culpability. Judges and lawyers are 
confronted daily with repeat individualised stories of social deprivation, unemployment, 
childhood neglect and abuse, addictions etc., that they can come to see them as 
unremarkable, developing a weary insouciance to accounts of deprivation and 
disadvantage. By repeatedly focusing only on the unique individual (rather than also 
placing her in the context of the wider general population) deprivation comes to be seen 
as the unremarkable norm. It becomes the benchmark from which an ‗interesting‘ 
exception is sought.
80
  
This examination personifies the individual, (whether explicitly or implicitly), by means 
of a baseline of judgement; a comparison with any given (and preferred) ‗normal 
population‘.  Thus, it is only where a person is considered unusual (e.g. privileged) that 
his/her social circumstances are considered worthy of particular note. For example, in 
the case of ‗Mr Laverty‘ most judges missed the reference in the ‗Education‘ section of 
reports to his ‗learning difficulties‘ and having attended ‗a special school‘:  
Judge 7: I didn‘t need to know what school he went to […..] 
Judge 5: [For] example [if] he was a product of Eton, Oxford or The Guards and was 
up on this sort of offence, you would be saying: ‗Wait a minute, what's all this 
about?!‘   
Judge 6:    Now, you've just made my point for me! 
Judge 7 : If I went to the local school, left without qualifications, fine, I mean I don't 
think it matters.  But if somebody did go to somewhere unusual like Eton or Harrow or 
whatever then maybe that's something we should throw into the equation.  
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3. Individualisation Re-Manifests Denial and Ambiguity as Free and Sincere 
Admissions of Guilt 
Where, in the first-phase of the rite of passage, a defendant wishes to maintain a plea of 
‗not guilty‘ she is confronted with a dilemma, for example by her defence lawyer. On 
the one hand, it is explained that if innocence continues to be professed even after 
conviction at trial, the sentence will be inflated. Mitigation and the humanising 
opportunity of individualisation will be lost and she can expect to be portrayed in a poor 
light. She will be seen as still being ‗in denial‘, and unwilling to ‗engage‘ or ‗work with‘ 
services trying to help her address her offending. On the other hand, if after conviction 
at trial she chooses to take up the opportunity of individualisation and mitigation by 
recognising her guilt, she can expect to be seen as ‗a chancer‘, seeking to exploit the 
system. She will have been seen to have knowingly wasted the court‘s time. Thus, the 
low-risk option is to change to a guilty plea.   
 
(a) Disengaged and Doubt-Provoking Postures 
The paradigm case in the lower and intermediate courts hinges on a free and sincere 
admission in which the person is shown to accept willingly the legitimacy of the process 
and so her own punishment. ―For if punishment is to be more than coercion, it must be 
justified to the person on whom it is imposed, … which she should come to accept and 
will for herself.‖81 However, following the guilty plea accomplished by the first-phase, 
individualisation in the second-phase may yield the appearance of an inconsistent, 
reluctant, or insincere guilty plea. For it is in the very need to display individualisation 
that their candid accounts have to be reported.  This can open a Pandora‘s Box of doubt 
about the voluntariness and legitimacy of the process.  
Paradoxically, court professionals can never be sure whether the person‘s account is 
authentic,
82
 precisely because that account is given in the shadow of the power of the 
court. On the one hand, free and sincere admissions of guilt and responsibility are 
encouraged and incentivised through the promise of humane treatment as an individual 
and the chance of mitigation. Yet on the other hand, the availability of that incentive, 
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(and threat of worse), necessarily entails potential doubt whether that admission is 
freely given and sincere.
83
  
People who to a greater or lesser extent, engage with an individualising inquiry, may 
voice accounts, which appear to be ambiguous, confused, insincere, or, appear to 
contradict their formal admission/plea.
84
 Thus, the court is faced with explicit or 
implicit resistance.
85
  Paraphrased, examples of such resistance include: ‗I only pled 
guilty to get it over with (e.g. I was being held in pre-trial detention)‘; ‗I was told to 
plead guilty by my lawyer‘; ‗I pled guilty for the sentence reduction‘; ‗I‘m taking the 
rap for someone else‘; I‘m not guilty but no I don‘t trust the system to believe me (e.g. 
because I‘ve been in trouble before‘; ‗I‘m pleading guilty but I don‘t accept I‘m truly 
culpable - it wasn‘t really my fault‘.   
On the other hand, a person who formally pleads guilty to a crime yet is seen to have 
failed to engage with the inquiry about her as an individual (e.g. in discussions with the 
defence lawyer, the pre-sentence investigation, or interaction in court) may be thought 
to display an unacceptable contempt for the process.
86
  Silence may be taken as tacit 
resistance. Avowal of the material confirmation of a factual truth  
―is insufficient: we demand an avowal that fulfils the dramaturgical role.‖ The court 
demands: ―‗Don‘t simply tell me what you did without telling me, at the same time 
and through this, who you are.‘‖87  
Such potentially threatening disengagement is converted by individualising work in the 
second-phase into displays of greater, (and ideally full), acknowledgement of guilt and 
acceptance of the impending sentence. Consider, for example, the pre-sentence 
investigation and report about ‗Craig Henderson‘, who pled guilty to breaking into a 
church. When discussing his attitude to the offence at the interview with the report 
writer, Craig presents a somewhat disengaged demeanour, cynical about the fairness of 
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the criminal process. He denies that he broke into the church, (he says it wasn‘t locked), 
but remarks that there was little point in him pleading ‗not guilty‘ since he has a 
significant criminal record which the report writer focuses his attention on. In his report, 
‗Fergal‘ presents Craig as ‗fully aware‘ and accepts that a custodial sentence is likely. 
Under the heading ‗Custody‘ Fergal writes: 
―Mr Henderson has served previous custodial sentences and he indicated that he is 
fully aware that the court may consider the imposition of a custodial sentence 
regarding the current matter. He accepts this situation.‖ [case 28, emphasis added]. 
In this way, Craig‘s passive cynicism manifested in a critical posture is conflated with 
awareness, converted into deemed acceptance of the likely sentence. 
Ambiguous guilty pleas and/or resistance, (usually implicit but occasionally explicit), 
also raise doubt and uncertainty among legal professionals.
88
 It questions the legitimacy 
of their role. The reader may recall that, as exemplar professionals who regard 
themselves as carrying the heavy triple-burden of personal responsibility for justice in 
the instant case, lawyers, and especially judges are almost bound to take signs of 
resistance personally. Persistent ambiguity is particularly threatening: 
―To portray oneself as not responsible for one‘s transgressive behaviour is to suggest 
that whatever punishment is meted out is undeserved…Those who do not accept 
responsibility… are the objects of judicial outrage.‖89  
The cherished idea of the free, voluntary admission of guilt accepting and, ideally even, 
willing one‘s own punishment demonstrated by ―a posture of abjection and surrender 
before the authority of the law‖90 is tainted by the implicit and explicit appearance of 
resistance. An ambiguous guilty plea raises a question mark as to whether the decision 
to enter a formal plea of guilty was a truly free. Normally the second-phase succeeds in 
neutralising this threat.   
The person who appears to present an inconsistent, or, insincere admission of guilt is 
faced with a problem. She is expected both to explain openly and sincerely the 
background, causation of and attitude to the offence and also display contrition, 
remorse, and willingness to change. In their study of the performance of remorse, van 
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Oorschot et al (2017) explain ―the catch-22 situation‖ which such defendants face.91 On 
the one hand, defendants are required: 
―to ‗tell their story‘ and give a causal and temporal account of what happened, [yet on 
the other hand] defendants must simultaneously ‗take responsibility‘ [for the 
offence]…‖92.  
The person whose formal admission of guilt is not matched by a fulsome or sincere 
admission has to reconcile a dilemma: to be both completely candid and also to accept 
full responsibility. The low-risk option is for the person, and for those re-presenting her 
story, to revise her position so that it is seen be compatible with the formal guilty plea. 
 
(b) The Key Role of the Defence Lawyer  
It is imperative that the defence lawyer ensures that the explanation which a client gives 
to the report writer for the offence does not appear to contradict the formal plea of 
guilty.  
Defence lawyer: ―[If] the client wasn‘t so sure [he is guilty but….] he‘d instructed you 
to plead guilty then […] I would say to them, ‗if you say to the social worker you 
didn‘t do this or you‘re innocent then that will cause you problems and it‘ll cause me 
problems[…] If you deny this offence when you speak to a social worker, it‘s not 
going to help you.‖  [Interview, defence lawyer 10] 
By heralding the opportunity of individualisation and mitigation, the person‘s account is 
aligned more closely with that of the ideal defendant who shows she fully accepts 
individual responsibility and her punishment. By presaging the opportunity of a positive 
interview with a report writer, the person is invited to edit irregularities in her own 
account of offending which jars with her guilty plea. It places the onus of the 
opportunity on the defendant. Defendants may be told: this is your chance and your 
responsibility to win over the report writer and get a more favourable sentence. In so 
doing, defence lawyers may be careful to depress optimistic sentence expectations 
meaning that the person is seen to be relieved, even occasionally grateful for, the 
sentence which the court later passes.  
 
4. Ritual Individualisation Transforms the Person into a Culpable Offender 
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Through the second-phase of Ritual Individualisation, defendant docility is transformed 
into a display of active acceptance; confusion into rational calculating decision-making. 
This is because individualisation requires both the person to voice ‗what happened‘ and 
perform an authentic posture of acceptance (ideally remorse).
93
 A key source of 
ambiguous admissions of guilt is the law itself. The distinction between legal and 
‗common-sense‘ versions of culpability can be non-intuitive. ―[D]efendants are required 
to navigate between a legal and a moral account‖94). Hardly surprising, then, that lay 
people are regarded by lawyers and judges to make claims to a legal ‗defence‘ to a 
crime to which they have already formally admitted guilt, rather than as mitigation at 
sentencing.  For example, in discussing his pre-sentence report, a focus group of judges 
find that Mr ‗Laverty‘,   (and whose brief mention in the report of ‗learning difficulties‘ 
and possible difficulties of ‗comprehension‘ were missed by the judges), is regarded to 
be trying a tactical legal manoeuvre. He is interpreted to be trying to justify his actions 
by claiming the legal self-defence of provocation
95
 while at the same time gaining the 
sentencing benefits of pleading guilty:  
Judge 17:    He also has tried to justify his actions as well – ‗He held her wrists for fear 
of her throwing something at him‘.  So he's throwing in there a wee self-defence 
prerequisite…    
Judge 18:   But if that was true he wouldn't have pled guilty. 
Judge 17:    But if that was true he wouldn't have pled guilty, yeah. 
Judge 18:   So the circle goes round. [Focus group 6] 
 
For the judges Mr Laverty is regarded as trying to ‗have his cake and eat it‘ by seeking 
both to gain the benefits of a guilty plea and potential mitigation while simultaneously 
also claiming a legal defence to the crime (self-defence) to which he has already pled 
guilty. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
By avoiding evidentially-contested trials, lawyers and judges are faced with a 
potentially troubling dilemma. On the one hand, there is a shared professional obligation 
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to dispose of cases speedily, with as little fuss and conflict as possible. The passivity of 
most defendants both facilitates and is facilitated by the ‗efficiency‘ of guilty pleas. Yet, 
on the other hand, in the awareness of this passivity, court professionals are also faced 
with the prospect of doubt about whether the person has participated freely; been 
humanely treated; had the context of her unique life recognised; and whether her formal 
admission of guilt is fully informed and sincere. These questions potentially cast doubt 
on whether punishment is legitimate.  The felt dilemma between the requirements of 
free participation by the unique individual and expeditious case-disposal cannot be 
resolved by an internal dialogue of self-justification, self-deception and denial of 
responsibility. The triple-burden of responsibility, which weighs heavily in lawyer and 
especially judicial self-image, means that fair process to the unique individual has to be 
made manifest to them by, in some way, witnessing the person to be sentenced freely 
accepting her guilt and the legitimacy of her punishment. This is achieved neither 
through self-deception nor pretence, but through the creative case-work of Ritual 
Individualisation (RI). Successful RI transforms the posture of the person shown to the 
court.  
Thus, successful RI should not be confused with the possible self-deception of 
professional self-talk, nor any simple notion of performance as pretence. It would be a 
mistake to dismiss RI as a vacuous exercise in professional deceit. Successful RI is far 
from that. Rather, as a result of individualisation-work, RI achieves a re-presentation of 
the person‘s orientation to the authority of the court. Through the person‘s own 
displayed communication, the legitimacy of the court is shown to the court community 
to be re-validated. By beholding convincing signs of the person‘s participation in and 
consent to the process, expeditious case-disposal is convincingly shown to be 
compatible with a fair and humane process.  Successful RI makes manifest to the court 
the person‘s full and free admission of culpability, her active participation as a unique 
individual and her acceptance of punishment.
96
 
 
1. Implications for Further Research 
(a) Professional Belief and Belonging 
Effective Ritual Individualisation restores faith in elevated professional beliefs and 
symbols, so renewing confidence in professional purpose and identity. In accounts 
illustrating a sense of professional pride, judges and lawyers tend to note that most 
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people accept the fairness of the process and sentence. The successful work of Ritual 
Individualisation constitutes and affirms cherished beliefs about the criminal process. 
Although the instant case has been ticked off the list, more importantly, the court 
community‘s moral universe is seen to have been tested and re-validated. This 
revalidation is the deeper achievement, without which the ‗efficient‘ disposal of the 
instant case would be more problematic. Rather than seeing the performative and 
expressive characteristics of ritual as opposed to efficient case-disposal, Ritual 
Individualisation facilitates expeditious case-disposal. By solidifying the accused as a 
familiar culpable subject who accepts her own punishment, professional self-belief and 
identification with court communities are fortified.    
There are, of course, instances when Ritual Individualisation fails convincingly to 
demonstrate the person‘s transformation. That a relatively small minority of defendants 
maintain a not guilty plea and are not convicted need not, however, necessarily threaten 
legal professional self-image. It can serve to show the professional court community 
that defendants always have a free choice and that the system is not rigged. Far more 
problematic is where, even after individualising work, the person presents a posture 
which casts doubt on the freeness and sincerity of her formal admission of guilt, thus 
presenting doubt about the fairness of the process to the professional court community. 
In systems regarded by court professionals as more or less fair, most of the time that 
doubt tends to be erased by the work of RI. Indeed, instances of initial resistance, which 
are followed by the manifestation of sincere acceptance of deserved punishment may be 
seen as particularly potent illustrations of the court‘s legitimacy.  
The argument of this article also raises questions about the role of humanistic values 
promoted by Thereapeutic Jurisprudence and Procedural Justice, (e.g. participation by 
and treatment of the person as an individual), in enhancing trust in officials and so legal 
compliance among those who come before law.
97
 While not necessarily disputing the 
propositions, this article suggests a different research focus. To-date research has 
concentrated on what lawyers, judges and other professionals believe humanistic 
process values do for those who come before them. The renewed interest in inclusive 
rituals and humanistic treatment in the legal process
98
 could now also consider its 
impact on professionals. To put it another way, research should now develop a focus on 
what TJ and PJ also do for professionals.  
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That said, we know remarkably little about how people subject to it experience the 
criminal-penal process, as a process. There is an urgent need to know more about how 
individualisation is experienced by those subject to its processes. Longitudinal studies 
of persons subject to the justice system are rare, yet the potential gains of such a follow-
through are significant. It can begin to tell us for instance how the individualisation 
process is experienced differently, (or similarly), by professionals and by those subject 
to them in the same cases. 
 
(b). Is Two-Stage Adversarial Procedure, in Reality, Fused? 
The implications of this article also query the sharp distinction between adversarial and 
inquisitorial models of the criminal procedure.
99
 Adversarial procedure is composed of 
two separate stages: guilt determination followed separately by sentencing.
100
  So as not 
to contaminate the separate and prior question of criminal conduct, the court is blind to 
the character and social status of the defendant unless and until it is proved that she can 
no longer be presumed innocent of the charge. By contrast, inquisitorial systems more 
or less simultaneously examine character alongside alleged criminal conduct, since one 
is integral to the other. For Anglo-American legal scholars, however, the  apparent 
failure to separate questions of alleged conduct from character can appear to be 
fundamentally illiberal. Those steeped in adversarial principles sometimes disparage 
inquisitorial procedure as ‗fused‘: a joining of two otherwise distinct entities (conduct 
and character). 
However, the reality of everyday routine practices of the adversarial system might more 
properly be described, albeit in different ways, as ‗fused‘.  This is not merely because 
the first stage (an evidentially-contested trial) is usually by-passed by a guilty plea.  
Rather, it is because the second stage (sentencing) looms so large in the decision about 
the first stage (plea). By heralding the coming opportunity of humane individualisation 
and mitigation, the two-stage distinction collapses into one. By presaging questions of 
defendant character, attitude to the (alleged) offence if convicted, suitability for 
rehabilitation etc, the process (and promise) of individualisation stimulates the 
‗contamination‘ of what is formally labelled matters of guilt together with matters of 
punishment. Indeed the formal temporal order of conviction followed by the separate 
stage of sentencing is, in effect, fused. Typically, therefore, sentencing is seen by court 
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actors as the ‗real‘ primary, practical question which, in effect, takes priority, so in 
effect, preceding the almost ‗inevitable‘ conviction via a guilty plea.101 
Whether, and in what ways, the consequences and practices of individualisation are 
shared or differ between (and within) national jurisdictions is a question which 
comparative research could fruitfully develop. Are the consequences of 
individualisation practices recognisable across jurisdictions? What are the nature of the 
similarities and differences? Despite these differences, do individualisation practices, as 
has been argued here, tend also to function as a way of managing the person's displayed 
posture?
102
 Do individualisation practices in different places also tend to re-present the 
person as a participating individual whose unique voice has been attended to and who 
freely accepts her impending punishment?
103
 If that is more or less recognisable as a 
broad consequence of individualisation-work, what are the varying legal and cultural 
dynamics which achieve such normalisation?  
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